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Abstract—Smart mobile devices have become an essential part 
of our lives, both professionally and privately. As we expand 
our digital presence and usage of these devices, we also 
increase the amount of evidence left behind. Locard’s principle 
states that every contact leaves a trace, a principle applicable 
not only to traditional crime but also the cyber realm. This 
project addresses an area in which this principle is applied, in 
terms of wireless networks and their access points that have 
been identified through the wireless scanning process. Both 
access points and smart devices use different, yet similar, 
network frames to advertise their existence before a connection 
can be established between two devices. These frames contain 
the data that this project aims to locate, MAC addresses, which 
are uniquely identifiable data, that can be used to identify any 
device that holds a wireless interface. By analysing the mobile 
device of a user after a short, city centre walk, the MAC 
addresses of nearby wireless access points were identified and 
used to retrace the route travelled by the user. However, as the 
information was only found in volatile memory, there was a 
limited timeframe to capture this data. 
Keywords-Digital Forensics; Android; Volatile Memory; 
Wireless Communication; MAC Address 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Technology has become an inescapable part of our lives. 
In particular, mobile devices have seen an exponential 
increase over the past decade, exceeding a regular computer 
in terms of the user specific information they contain. With 
this development, law enforcement has recognised the 
potential evidentiary value that mobile devices possess, but 
are struggling to match the pace in which mobile devices are 
being developed.  This includes the development of forensic 
tools that are available for practitioners.  
Mobile devices require an operating system (OS) to 
function. Google´s open-source Android OS currently holds 
87.6% of the total mobile device market share [1]. To benefit 
from all the features of a modern mobile device, users need 
to be connected to the Internet. 
Inherently, with the growing number of mobile devices, 
the need to access wireless networks is growing. Individuals 
often want their device to connect to the Internet through 
known access points (AP) as soon as they are within reach. 
This results in the wireless scanners on mobile devices 
always, or regularly, scanning for APs, regardless of their 
location.  
From a digital forensics perspective, data can be 
extracted and analysed from mobile devices, helping to 
create a timeline of events and actions, such that it can be 
used as evidence in a court of law [2]. Mobile forensics and 
digital forensics as a whole, are constantly playing catch up 
with the ever evolving and multiplying collective noun of 
technology. Possibly one of the cases in recent times with 
the greatest media coverage for mobile forensics was the 
locked Apple device belonging to one of the suspects of the 
attack in San Bernardino in December 2015 [3].  
Edmond Locard, a pioneer within forensic science, 
stated that every contact leaves a trace [4]. This applies not 
only in the physical world, but also in the digital world 
where evidence is represented in bits and bytes [5].  
Applying Locard’s principle, this study aims to identify, 
extract and analyse artefacts left over from the frequent 
communications between mobile devices and nearby 
wireless APs. This information will then be used to 
reconstruct a timeline of events that could be used to aid an 
investigation.  
The remainder of this paper is divided into the following 
sections: Section II addresses and presents the Android OS, 
both its inner workings and how it communicates with 
wireless networks and related work. Section III elaborates on 
the experiments created for the project, including the devices 
utilised. Section IV presents the findings from the applied 
methodology, with a discussion regarding their presence and 
their evidentiary value in a criminal investigation. Lastly, 
Section V concludes the project, with an elaboration on 
further research derived from this project. 
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK 
A. Wireless Networks 
Wireless communication has, for the past two decades, 
been under the 802.11 standard. APs and routers are two 
terms that often are used interchangeably, regardless of their 
distinct differences [6]. A router can route traffic it is sent 
and be an AP, whilst an AP only extends the range of the 
wireless networks. In this paper, the term AP includes both 
routers and APs. 
As with all digital devices that communicate through the 
802.11 standard, they are required to have a unique Media 
Address Control (MAC) which they can be identified by [7]. 
It is a 48-bit sequence of hexadecimal characters in the 
following format ff:ff:ff:aa:aa:aa. The three first hexadecimal 
sets are used to identify the manufacturer and the remaining 
three are used to identify the specific device.  
Wireless APs need methods of either informing about 
their presence or finding other devices. This is done through 
what is known as active and passive discovery [8], by 
advertisement of their existence, which includes sharing their 
MAC addresses. Active discovery consists of the mobile 
device searching for APs, sending out probe request with the 
Service Set Identifier (SSID) of previously connected APs 
and hence wishes to connect [8]. Should an AP match the 
SSID to which the mobile device wishes to connect to, it 
would reply with a probe response. In passive discovery, it is 
the AP that sends out frames called beacons containing 
information about itself [9]. 
 
Figure 1.  Active discovery [10] 
B. Android OS  
The Android OS facilitates a freely open and accessible 
OS, which in turn manufacturers and users can make their 
own. When it was developed by the Open Handset Alliance 
in 2007, there were three functional requirements that the 
software needed to provide; methods of connecting to the 
Internet, methods of accessing and downloading 
applications and methods of storing data on the device itself 
[11].  
There are two types of memory one will often find in 
smart devices, volatile and non-volatile, both of which can 
have value in a criminal investigation. Through this research 
it became evident that non-volatile data has been subject to 
a greater deal of research than its sibling, volatile data, in 
terms of both recovery and its application in criminal 
investigations. This may be due to the nature of the data 
having little to no application in a court of law, as it has 
often been lost or obsolete before an investigator could 
access it. 
Android mobile devices have an Application 
Programming Interface (API) identified as android.net.wifi, 
which is the location where the rules for how the wireless 
network entity functions [12]. This also addresses the time 
intervals in which a devices searches for wireless networks, 
as per the active discovery method. Specifically, for the 
device used in this research, the time interval between scans 
was 15 seconds. 
An Android device can be rooted by a user to allow for 
administrative privileges, which enables the instalment of 
applications not supported by Google Play. This is not the 
only result of the rooting process, as it also allows an 
investigator to access data that they would otherwise have 
difficulty obtaining, such as volatile memory. There are a 
variety of tools available for this process such as King Root 
Android and One-Click Root, which manipulates a 
manufacture specific software weakness in the OS [13]. An 
issue arises when a device that is not rooted is obtained at a 
crime scene, as the act of rooting a device could directly 
affect the device and the data within. As there are no 
methods of providing integrity controls pre- and post-
rooting.  
C. Related Work 
Mobile devices can contain a plethora of evidence that 
may be of pertinent importance in an investigation. There is 
a range of tools available to source predetermined 
information from a mobile device. However, from the AP 
evidentiary aspect of mobile devices, the only research 
located was by Andriotis et al. [14] and Minnaard´s 
contribution in terms of AP memory [15], reversing the 
process and analysing APs.  
Andriotis et al. [14] produced findings that confirmed 
that there were traces of communication between devices, 
both when using 802.11 and Bluetooth technologies. 
Locations were specified within the filesystems of the 
devices they performed experiments on, however they early 
identified that some of the locations were device specific to 
manufacturers. In particular for this research a file named 
cache.wifi in the /data/com.google.android.location/files was 
of interest, as it contained details of AP MAC addresses of 
and timestamps.  
The study performed by Minnaard [15] addressed the 
opposing angle to this project; traces left on APs. As with 
Andriotis’ study, the data was located in buffers (volatile 
memory), hence subject to potentially frequent change, 
depending on the device at hand. In addition to this, the 
application of Locard’s principle can be derived from 
Minnaard’s research, as any devices within a crime scene 
that supports, may store traces to help determine who, where 
and when, without consideration of the role of the device.   
In terms of Locards principle, it has been subject to 
discussion whether the term ‘contact’ is fitting in the 
physical world [16]. This is due to there may not be any 
contact between the receiver and the source. A  term they 
coined and believed to be better was ‘transference’, as there 
need not be contact between two entities for one of them to 
leave or receive a trace. This is also applicable in this 
research, as the smart device in question does not connect 
with APs, but rather there is a transference of unique 
identifiable data, in which they can later use to connect.  
To determine the location of an AP there are a range of 
freely available network mapper tools that can be used to 
establish their location, using either SSID or MAC. The most 
prominent one found in research was WiGle [14, 17] which 
holds at the time of writing, information on 374,956,858 
APs. A less known tool is the LocationAPI provided by 
Unwired Labs. At the time of writing it holds 1.5 billion 
entries [18] which is far greater than WiGle. Increasing the 
possibility that a particular AP is stored in the LocationAPI 
tool with 356% over WiGle.  
III. METHODOLOGY  
The work conducted in this project employed an 
experimental approach, with two independent experiments; 
one laboratory and one field-based experiment. The 
experiments where inherently similar, with the difference of 
the device being exposed to the real world, in the field 
experiment, hence subject to many unknown factors. This is 
the advantage of such an experiment, its application in the 
real world, however creating a fundamental idea of how 
technology works in a strict, controlled laboratory 
environment is also important.  
When addressing digital evidence and technology, there 
are certain guidelines one may choose to follow or must 
adhere to; in the United Kingdom, there are four principles 
known as The Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) 
guidelines [19]. These principles are simplified as, no data 
should be changed that can be relied upon in court. The 
examiner needs to be competent when accessing original 
data, to justify decisions. An audit trail of all actions needs 
to be documented and lastly there has to be a lead 
investigator with overall responsibility for adhering to both 
law and guidelines. These were applied and followed during 
the experiments conducted in this research.  
 As with any forensics investigation it is key that an 
investigator is methodical and thorough when addressing a 
mobile device. To adhere to these two aspects, specific 
methods and methodologies are selected. Within the 
forensics environment there are a range of methodologies, 
ranging from being very open-ended with phases in the 
process whilst some may give the investigator specific tasks 
all the way through. It is, however, important to 
acknowledge that they all cover the same core topics [20].  
In this research, the general digital forensics model is 
used. The advantage of applying the general forensic 
process model is simplicity [21]. By making it an 
uncomplicated process, in which each phase builds upon the 
previous, without the deeply detailed coverage, which 
would differ from device to device, each aspect of the 
investigation is addressed.  There are four steps to this 
methodology: collection of media, examination of data, 
analysis of information and presentation of results. 
Many tools exist to help complete digital investigations. 
These can be both open source tools and commercially 
available tools. However, these are often based on finding 
artefacts that one knows exists [22]. Resulting in a 
magnitude of evidence, both exculpatory and incriminating, 
being missed and possibly leading to an incorrect conviction 
[23]. As a defence for any legal practitioner, there are not 
enough hours in the day to manually sift through the ever-
growing amount of data that one may be given in a case, 
hence why one will utilise tools that may not portray all 
essential data. 
The device used as a digital forensics workstation in the 
experiments was an Asus laptop running the OS version 64-
bit Kali Linux 2012.2. This OS allowed the device to be 
forensically clean upon conducting the collection, extraction 
and analysis of each experiment. 
 Android Debugger Tool (ADB) facilitates communicate 
with an Android device through a shell, which 
accommodates the use of certain commands that can be used 
to create images of mobile devices, either fully or partially 
[24]. In this research it was used to acquire the state of the 
memory. 
The Android mobile device used for this research is 
presented in Table I. As the tool selected for the collection of 
media is an Android specific tool, namely ADB, this 
methodology can only be applied to a device running the 
Android operating system. Hence excluding Windows and 
Apple devices from this research. This device was not 
connected to a mobile network. In both the experiments there 
were tasks that needed to be completed prior to the 
generation of data, followed by the general digital forensics 
methodology. 
  
1) The Android mobile device was reset to factory 
settings.  
2) Connected to the Internet to allow the device to 
perform updates.  
3) Developer Options in settings was enabled and the 
setting USB debugging was permitted [25]. 
4)  The device was disconnected from the network and the 
network was forgotten, in such that it would not 
connect to it again, during the experiment.  
TABLE I.  DEVICE SPECIFICATION 
Feature Motorola moto E 
Operating System Android 4.4.4 
Memory 1GB 
MAC Address 80:6c:1b:72:c4:9c 
A. Laboratory-based Data Generation 
Being able to create an understanding for where potential 
data regarding APs were stored, the length in which the data 
was stored and what data was stored, was the at the pinnacle 
of this research project. To enable such an understanding, a 
laboratory-based experiment with limited outside 
interference was conducted. This included the usage of a 
Linksys router in which the MAC address was known. 
In this scenario, the mobile device was allowed to search 
for wireless networks in time intervals of 10, 20 and 30 
minutes. As previously identified, the mobile device searches 
every 15 seconds for APs. This would further mean that for 
ten minutes it would have completed 40 scans; for 20 
minutes, it would have completed 80 scans; and for 30 
minutes, 120 scans would have been completed. Thus, 
rendering a sufficient amount of data generated for scanning 
and the potential length of time it is stored there.  
Additionally, the Aeroplane mode was identified to 
potentially have an effect on the data stored on the device, as 
enabling it would stop further searches of wireless networks, 
and potentially therefore avoid the deletion of prior scans as 
the memory of the device was limited. Hence a scan of 15 
minutes was completed, in which the Aeroplane mode was 
TABLE II.  STRINGS SEARCHED 
Strings Reasoning 
ssid Often used as the prefix before presenting an APs name. 
wifi Identifies any occurrence of the Android device enabling or using wireless features. 
mac Often used as the prefix before presenting an APs unique identity. 
([0-9A-Fa-f]{2}[:-]){5}([0-9A-Fa-f]{2}) Regular expression that matches the pattern of a MAC address.  
 
enabled and after 5 minutes the device was subject to the 
same methodology as in the collection, extraction and 
analysis section.   
B. Field-based Data Generation 
To compare the results from the laboratory experiments 
with the field-based experiments, a route was determined in a 
highly populated area, both in terms of people and 
businesses. At certain points in the route the time of passing 
was manually documented in a logbook. This was to enable 
the comparison of timestamps potentially found on the 
device, with those manually confirmed via the log.  
Two scenarios were established and completed for data 
generation for the field experiment. One where the mobile 
device remained in the pocket of the researcher and the other 
where the mobile device was used to record the time of 
passing at specific points on a predetermined route. In both 
scenarios, the wireless search function was enabled at the 
start of the route. This was based on the fact that many 
individuals use their mobile device whilst walking, either for 
communication, entertainment or simply direction guidance, 
and that this may have had an impact on data generated. The 
predetermined route took approximately 15 minutes to walk, 
the distance being 1.4 kilometres, from start to finish, from 
Glasgow Central station to the corner of Sauchiehall Street 
and West Nile Street.  
  
Figure 2.  Established route 
C. Collection, Extraction and Analysis  
Although the methods of data generation differed, the 
process of media collection, data extraction and information 
analysis were similar. The files that were extracted from the 
mobile device, were labelled with the date and time of 
which the collection and specific task was initiated.  
1) The mobile device and forensic workstation were 
connected through a USB cable to allow 
communication and the following command was 
used to confirm connection, 
adb devices 
2) The memory data of the device was collected,  
adb shell dumpstate > 
location/filename.txt  
3) To allow for evidence continuity and integrity a 
SHA256 hash value was calculated for each 
memory extractions,  
sha256sum location/filename.txt >> 
hash_values.txt 
4) Having completed the media collection, the phase 
of data examination was reached and points of 
potential interest extracted. This was completed 
using the strings command, piping it into a grep 
search, as identified in Table II. The command 
syntax used for the strings search was:  
strings filename.txt | grep –i 
‘searchstring’ > 
filename_searchstring.txt 
5) For the regular expression search the following 
syntax was used, 
strings filename.txt | grep –E ‘RegEx’ 
> filename_searchstring.txt 
6) These search files were also subjected to a SHA256 
hash value calculation for evidence continuity. 
 
Having sifted the information, it was then manually 
analysed to establish if the different experiments were 
rendered fruitful in terms of the evidence found.  
IV. RESULTS  
The two experiments that were conducted were 
independent of each other, however, combined they gave an 
understanding and potential application in a real-world  
scenario. 
A. Laboratory Results   
Data containing information about APs was discovered in 
the volatile memory of the mobile device. However, no 
traces of any Wi-Fi communication were located in non-
volatile memory.  
The search results found scans entitled 
‘WIFI_SCAN_RESULTS’ that included the date and time in 
which the scan started. Following this, each AP that the 
mobile device had communicated with were listed, including 
the SSID and MAC address. Additionally, it was found that 
these entries appeared every 15 seconds, which confirmed 
that the scans did indeed occur in the specified time interval 
in the laboratory environment.  
The information of greatest value was found in the mac 
entry for each of the identified APs in the memory of the 
device. Upon initial inspection, it was apparent that if this 
was the MAC address of an AP, it had been obfuscated as it 
was not presented in its normal hexadecimal format. The 
string found within the memory was determined to be 
decimal, as when converted to hexadecimal it represented the 
MAC address format. This was confirmed by comparing a 
known MAC address to its converted decimal to 
hexadecimal value.  
A further issue that was observed upon conversion was 
the absence of a hexadecimal value in the string, as there was 
only five, not the required six values. When the value is 
stored in memory and the value is converted to decimal, if 
there are two leading zeros in the MAC address, these two 
are suppressed. This only occurred when they were leading, 
and not when there were two zeros in the middle of the 
address. An example would be the MAC address 
A2:EE:A6:9C:F1, which is missing a hexadecimal value, 
when converted to its decimal value 699788598513. But by 
adding the two leading zeros the issue was mitigated, and 
converting the value 00:A2:EE:A6:9C:F1 gave the same 
decimal value as in the memory.  
The regular expression search yielded results that the 
other string searches did not find; an entry in the memory 
which stored SSIDs and MAC addresses in clear text and 
original format. This was found under an identifying process 
number, which varied from collection to collection. A theory 
is that this is the last scan which is presented to the users 
when they choose which network they wish to connect to, 
however, this could not be confirmed.   
All the data located was of the volatile type, which is 
sensitive to change, through the effects of time or device 
usage. This included the scan entries in the memory, as after 
10 to 11 minutes the last scan was overwritten and lost. 
Additionally, the experiment determined, as expected, that 
data was lost when the device was powered down.   
The aeroplane mode had no effect on the length in which 
the data was stored in the memory of the device. Even 
though all communication channels were disabled, there are 
still processes running on the device that require memory 
and resulted in the entries being lost.  
During one of the experiments, the mobile device had not 
been disconnected from the Internet, having concluded the 
preparatory phase. This raised the question if there would 
potentially be more or other pieces of evidence regarding 
location, having been connected during active discovery. 
Therefore, the media was extracted and analysed per the 
aforementioned methodology.  
Within the memory dump, two entries named, 
wifiResult=WifiLocatorResult were found within the results 
of two AP searches. The time difference between the two did 
not establish any identifiable regularity in which they would 
appear. These two entries included all the APs seen in the 
scan and included what appeared to be latitude and longitude 
coordinates. The application of these two values into Google 
Maps displayed that the coordinates were within close 
proximity to where the experiments were taking place. It is 
unknown how the coordinates were determined, other than 
the device itself using its Global Positioning System (GPS) 
to establish these.  
B. Field Results 
There were two different scenarios created for this 
experiment. One where the phone was left in a pocket and 
not interacted with during the route, and the other where the 
device was used to determine the time of passing specific 
locations. These two scenarios yielded different results.  
For the no-interaction scenario, no significant data was 
discovered from the device when it was analysed upon 
completion of the route. This revealed that the device 
required some form of interaction to initiate the scans. 
When the device was utilised to determine the time of 
passing, there was evidence of wireless network scans in the 
memory. By accessing the screen to determine the time of 
passing, the device appeared to initiate a scan that was equal 
to the time of passing. These were not split by 15 second 
intervals as found in the laboratory experiment, but rather the 
time in which the screen was activated.  
Part of this research was to determine if the data gathered 
could be used to track the movements of a device, through 
the collected MAC addresses. This was done through the 
LocationAPI tool, where the MAC addresses were plotted on 
a map and was correlated with the predetermined route map. 
Through this, one could easily determine the route the device 
had taken, although the first 5 minutes of the route was 
missing from the map, as these scans had been lost due to the 
10 – 11 minutes storage time of scans in the memory.  
 
Figure 3.  APs seen by the mobile device 
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
From this research, we have established that under 
certain circumstances, evidence of Wi-Fi interactions can be 
located in the memory of Android mobile devices.  
As identified by Minnaard [15], the inner workings of a 
device can inform an investigator about how it interacts with 
wireless networks, but that does not infer that evidence of 
communications are always present. This is clear in the 
experiments that were conducted, as data was present when 
certain variables were applied and absent when not. In 
addition, the length of time which it was stored comes under 
Minnaard’s contribution, as it was only contained in 
memory for ten minutes until the first entry was overwritten, 
or the device was powered down. This is a very limited time 
frame for any investigator.  
To access the memory of this Android device, it had to 
be rooted and this was done prior to the experiments. 
Rooting the device would result in the device being powered 
down and memory data would be lost. An investigator 
would therefore have to refer to the ACPO guidelines, 
providing justifications for their actions and acknowledging 
the potential consequences.  
The evidence gathered from these experiments showed 
that there are alternative methods of establishing where a 
device has been, in contrast to traditional location data 
portrayed through GPS. An extended use of this data could 
be in conjunction with GPS data to corroborate the location 
of the device at a specific point in time. 
In terms of utilisation within law enforcement, the 
findings of this research are limited due to the length of time 
the information was stored. An area for future research is to 
determine if other applications on the device utilise the Wi-
Fi information and store it in non-volatile memory. This 
would allow investigators more time to capture this 
information and recreate a timeline of user movements. 
Further future research should encompass other devices 
and other OSs, such as iOS and Windows, in such a way that 
a further understanding and potential application of 
techniques to access data for use in law enforcement can be 
determined.  
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